SummaryThis paper sets the developmental view of Piaget and the structural perspective of Lonergan in juxtaposition for the purpose of allowing their complementary approaches on objectivity to jointly illuminate their common epistemological theme of the constitutive role of the creative and constructive knowing subject at the heart of the cognitive process, as well as to highlight what I argue is their commonly shared and fundamental epistemological thesis of self‐transcending subjectivity: the radical identity of genuine objectivity and authentic subjectivity — that (...) subjectivity is objective insofar as it transcends itself.RésuméCet article met la vue génétique de Piaget en parallèle avec la perspective structurale de Lonergan. Leurs approches complémentaires de l'objectivitééclairent leur thème épistémologique commun, c'est‐à‐dire le rôle du sujet connaissant créateur et constructeur au cœur du processus de connaissance. L'auteur souligne leur thèse épistémologique commune qu'il appelle subjectivité auto‐transcendante: l'identité radicale de la véritable objectivité et de l'authentique subjectivité, car cette subjectivité est objective dans la mesure où elle se transcende elle‐même.ZusammenfassungEs wird der genetische Standpunkt Piagets mit dem strukturalen von Lonergan verglichen, um zu zeigen, wie ihre komplementären Betrachtungsweisen der Objektivität den gemeinsamen erkenntnistheoretischen Gegenstand ihrer Untersuchung, nämlich die konstitutive Rolle des schöpferischen und konstruierenden Erkenntnissubjekts im Erkenntnisprozess, beleuchten. Es geht um die gemeinsame, fundamental These der sich selbst transzendierenden Subjektivität: die radikale Identität der wahren Objektivität und der echten Subjektivität. Das Subjektive kann nur, sofern es sich selbst trans‐zendiert, objektiv werden. (shrink)

Erik Erikson's work in psychosocial developmental theory has made valuable contributions to the field of religious ethics on some very basic issues. This paper makes scattered elements of Erikson's explicit ethical perspective available in concise fashion for critical ethical reflection. It does this in such a way as to highlight the centrally important fact for religious ethics that implicitly operative in Erikson's view is a criterion of "self-transcendence" as definitive of mature personal (fully human, ethical) development.

After reviewing Newman’s famous defense of conscience in his Letter to the Duke of Norfolk (1875), this essay assembles Newman’s lifelong reflections on conscience—from his Anglican sermons to his Grammar of Assent (1870)—in a threefold structure: desire, discernment, and demand.

As a way of overcoming the conflict between the Apologia’s focus on Liberalism and Frank Turner’s recent insistence that the real Tractarian target was Evangelicalism, this essay proposes that Newman’s fundamental opponent was subjectivism.

During the past thirty years, scholars and commentators have produced a flood of articles and books on almost every aspect and feature of Berkeley's work. There are, however, very few points on which these commentators agree. Since the debate shows no signs of abating, Walter Creery has gathered together a collection of the more significant articles in this extremely useful and accessible form. These three volumes gather together eighty-seven articles on Berkeley's views on the central issues of the philosophy (...) of language, the theory of vision, qualities, general ideas, matter, the theory of mind, and notions. The collection contains articles both harshly critical of Berkeley as well as those sympathetic with the philosopher's views, and there has been an attempt to balance the selection between the immaterialist and idealist theories. (shrink)

A translation of the main text for only published version J. G. Fichte's later WL. (Hitzig: Berlin 1810). It excludes Fichte's Preface.

The defense argument in favor of abortion sees the fetus as an invader, a trespasser, someone against whom violence is justified, since this very young person (the fetus) has initiated violence against his mother. Hewitt [30] rejects this argument. The present paper maintains the justification of this defense argument. My perspective is based on the private property rights of the mother. She owns her person. It is as if her body is her house, and a trespasser has invaded it. Surely, (...) she has the right to evict such a person. This analogy is relatively easy to see in the case of rape. The unwanted fetus, now occupying a part of her body is in effect a intruder. If she really owns her body, which I contend she certainly does, she has a right to expel this person from her property. I also argue that voluntary sexual intercourse does not constitution an “invitation” for the pre-born baby to occupy her premises for nine months. (shrink)

What is the proper punishment from the perspective of the libertarian philosophy? More specifically, in what way, if at all, may a thief benefit from his robbery? The present essay attempts to wrestle with these challenging questions.

Ethics, Policy & Environment, Volume 15, Issue 1, Page 33-36, March 2012.

L'A. étudie la concurrence entre la matière, la forme et la composition de matière et de forme, pour le titre de substance première ousia dans la «Métaphysique» Z, 3 d'Aristote. L'A. s'oppose à l'interprétation qu'en donne L. Gill dans son livre «Aristotle on Substance: The Paradox of Unity», selon laquelle l'ει~δο et la composition sont toutes deux premières. L'A. propose une explication qui s'inscrit dans le cadre métaphysique de la théorie de la recherche.

What is the source of the antipathy of Catholic intellectuals toward free markets? That is the issue addressed in the present paper. We see the antecedents of this viewpoint of theirs in terms of secular humanism, Marxism and mistaken views of morality and economics. One of the explanations for this phenomenon are the teachings of St Augustine. He greatly distrusted the City of Man, seeing it as anarchic and chaotic. In contrast, his City of God is more orderly, but far (...) removed from the hurly burly of free enterprise. Another source of the rejection of capitalism on the part of Catholic intellectuals is liberation theology, which is Marxism minus the atheism of that doctrine. Both economic and cultural Marxism have played a role in the alienation of such intellectuals from the tenets of laissez faire capitalism. Are there any counter currents? Yes, the School of Salamanca, which has been all but forgotten in this community. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy and Literature 25.1 (2001) 169-171 [Access article in PDF] Book Review The Passion for Happiness: Samuel Johnson and David Hume The Passion for Happiness: Samuel Johnson and David Hume, by Adam Potkay; 241 pp. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000, $42.50. This book is a sustained attack on the widespread impression that Samuel Johnson and David Hume were antithetical characters, a notion largely nourished by that memorable moment when (...) Boswell brings up Hume "and other skeptical innovators" and Johnson replies, as we all remember, "Truth will not afford sufficient food to their vanity; so they have betaken themselves to error. Truth, sir, is a cow which will yield such people no more milk, and so they have gone to milk the bull." Professor Potkay feels that this image has radically distorted our perception of the truth.A large part of the problem, as Potkay sees it, is that the Johnson of the biography is not the same as the Johnson seen in his writings. Boswell, he claims, "superbly fashioned a Johnson after his own heart" (p. 29). Biography is beset with the misapprehensions we all have of another individual, but personal writing is equally subject to rhetorical posturing, selective memory, and other histrionics of the ego.Potkay makes a strong and interesting case for the proposition that Johnson and Hume were in accord as to their ideas of happiness. "Johnson and Hume set forth largely compatible visions of human happiness that, while rooted in Cicero, draw as well on modern authors..." (p. 5). In this view, happiness is intrinsically social, the inverse of Sartre's L'enfer, c'est les autres. We are estimable in our own eyes only if we are so in the eyes of others. The astronomer in Rasselas finally surmounts his delusion that he controls the weather only by leaving his solitude for the society of others. Hume declared that perfect solitude is the greatest punishment that we can suffer (p. 60). Hume and Johnson both agree that cities afford the greatest happiness through a multiplicity of agreeable consciousness--London for Johnson and Paris for Hume.Potkay argues that the chief ethic in the writings of both Hume and Johnson [End Page 169] "is the eclectic, Ciceronian brand of Stoicism Hume delineates in 'the Stoic', a sociable Stoicism whose end is 'the moderating of our passions, the enlightening of our reason'" (p. 77). The path to happiness lies in cultivating reason and moderating passion. However, unlike ethicists that downgrade the passions, Hume and Johnson see the passions as necessary and good. As against the whole duty of man, they think that pride is good, unless it causes pain to others. This is fresh news for those of us who have squirmed in Sunday school classes when pride was severely denounced and humility recommended--squirmed in spite of our reverence for Milton. Johnson and Hume viewed pride and the pleasure derived from praise as inspiring progress in trades, professions, arts, and science. It excites ingenuity. This is what we didn't dare say in Sunday school.Potkay searches indefatigably for parallels between the two men. We are told that they both rejected the hard determinism that some thinkers derived from Newtonian physics. In the midst of all this we have another discussion of tragedy, pity and fear, etc., the sort of thing that requires the reckless exuberance of youth in order to relish. Are we expected to feel astonished that here too we find them in accord? The parallels between the two men are pushed to the point that a reader might begin to suspect that there is a hidden half of the text that is being withheld, perhaps countervailing evidence. We begin to feel that lurking suspicion evoked by someone too zealously dedicated to a thesis.By the middle of the book, a reader is likely to be convinced that far from going forth to milk the bull, Hume was almost an intellectual twin of Johnson. At the same time, though, sepia thoughts begin to seep into the mind. We notice that these parallel thoughts... (shrink)

The Logic of Law Making in Islam: Women and Prayer in the Legal Tradition. By Behnam Sadeghi. Cambridge Studies in Islamic Civilization. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013. Pp. xxi + 215. $99.99, £64.99.

In light of recent advances, I reconsider Jacques Ellul's technological imperative in which he places technology in a broad framework of “technique” (including but not limited to machines) meaning any complex of standardized procedures having absolute efficiency for attaining a predetermined result. He conceptualizes technique as a self-perpetuating, totalizing, and deterministic force inevitably leading to self-destruction if not transcended. Here, I provide support for some of Ellul's claims while addressing some of the important criticisms. I suggest a different kind of (...) imperative that supersedes the technological imperative but does not diminish its importance. The new imperative is hierarchical social structures that now prevail at many levels—from global to local—and that reciprocally relate to many social forces, including technique. Central to the maintaining of social hierarchies are both individual and collective goals and beliefs. I argue the importance of ideology in both science and society, and in technological and hierarchical imperatives. Specifically, I argue the necessity to account for the mutual and reciprocal relationship among beliefs, context, and human attributes to fully comprehend technology and education. (shrink)

Ayn Rand most certainly favored liberty, although she renounced the "libertarian" appellation. Yet, in her continuous, contemptuous and shrill attacks on religion, she was denigrating an institution that has made great contributions to freedom. The present essay is an attempt to right the balance; to demonstrate that religion and liberty are not the enemies supposed by Rand.